Buying into Occupation and War

The implications of military ties between South America and Israel

Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign
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Glossary of acronyms

AEL: Aeroelectronica Industria de Componentes Avionicos (Elbit Systems subsidiary in Brazil)

AUC: Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

BAT: Beit Alfa Technologies

IAI: Israel Aerospace Industries

IMI: Israel Military Industries

ISDS: International Security and Defense Systems

IWI: Israeli Weapon Industries

PMSC: Private military and security company

MoD: Ministry of Defense

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (sometimes referred to as drones)
I. Executive summary

Israeli military exports to South America have been on the rise in the recent years. Brazil is gearing up to become the gateway for Israeli military technology and companies. Israel continues to be a top supplier of the Colombian military. Ecuador, while not having extensive military ties with Israel, has recently purchased drone aircraft. Chile, already a buyer of Israeli arms, also has expressed interest in similar drone technology.

It is the goal of this report to analyze these trends, both in light of recent events and also as they relate to the history of Israeli involvement in South America. **We will highlight that it is impossible for South America’s democratic governments to reconcile protection of human rights - whether at home or abroad - with military ties and arms trade with Israel.**

Any military ties with Israel support the state’s policies of occupation, apartheid and ethnic cleansing, policies whose sustainability depends on Israeli military capacities and the profits deriving from its military industry, and adversely affect the Palestinians and their struggle. Israel has developed an indigenous military industry that produces much of the equipment used by its military. International buyers help ensure the survival of the Israeli military industry which:

- **Has in exports a necessary lifeline.** The Israeli national military industry survives on exporting, without which it would collapse.

- **Profits considerably from the occupation in terms of marketing.** Private military and security companies (PSMCs) advertise how their employees’ years of experience set them apart, while Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) producers highlight their products’ performance and extensive use by the Israeli military. However, advertising need not be as explicit, as in the military industry products are judged on their performance in the field, meaning, “every military operation, not by intent per se, acts as an advertisement for the weapons and techniques used.”¹ The fact that Israel has a constant “battlefield” in the West Bank and Gaza is a significant advantage to its military industry.

- **Develops more effective means of repression.** Years of experience in operating in Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps, for example, has helped Israeli Weapon Industries (IWI) to develop an effective rifle for urban combat. Constant mobilization by the popular resistance against the Wall has in turn forced the Israeli military to develop more effective means of crowd control to break demonstrations. The constant use of UAVs has allowed ample opportunities for real-time testing and development.
Military ties with Israel do not only fuel an occupation that affects Palestinians, but also have negative effects on South America.

- **Strengthening ties with Israeli arms producers and PSMC sets a poor precedent in terms of accountability**, considering Israel’s support of repressive regimes and role in profiting and fostering from instability in the 60s, 70s and 80s.

- Military ties with Israel leave elements in place which could support or form oppressive, and at the most extreme anti-government activity, in a given country.

- Even if military ties pose no threat to a country’s stability, support of the Israeli military industry casts doubt on a government’s commitment to human rights.

Despite these issues, **Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador are all buyers of Israeli military equipment and/or services**. In addition to the supply of conventional arms there has been a steady rise in high-tech exports, in particular Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) technology. Colombia, Brazil and Ecuador have purchased Israeli UAVs. Chile has also expressed interest in buying UAVs, and Israeli companies will certainly attempt to win these contracts. This is inappropriate for the following reasons:

- **Argentina and Chile are both still dealing with the traumatic legacy left by their respective dictatorships.** (Re)building military ties with Israel is thus wholly inappropriate, as these same companies provided weapons and support for the dictatorships.

- **Brazil and Ecuador have been vocally supportive of Palestinian rights.** Ecuador has harshly criticized Israel, while Brazil has made it clear it wants to play a serious role in the peace process. However, both of these countries are buying Israeli weapons and deepening military ties with Israel. This ensures that the Israeli military industry is allowed to perpetuate itself, thus directly supporting war, occupation and repression.

It is unacceptable that South American states, especially those that espouse progressive principles, hand over their taxpayers’ money and the wealth of their countries to the Israeli arms industry and the system it supports. In the end, a decision must be made between dealing with Israel and its weapons or standing with the Palestinian people, human rights and democracy and cutting military ties with Israel.
II. Methodology

While global arms trade is for a large part fuelling conflict and reinforcing colonial or neo-colonial relationships, military ties with Israel are a particularly problematic case within this framework. Israel maintains the longest military occupation in the world. The state and its army have been repeatedly denounced by United Nations bodies and international human rights organizations for war crimes, most recently in the Goldstone Report reviewing the violations of international law during the Israeli attack on Gaza in the winter of 2008/2009.

Moreover, Israel uses the weapons and profits produced by its military industry to promote a policy of expansionism, apartheid and ethnic cleansing and what Richard Falk has called a “prelude to genocide” in Gaza. None of these Israeli policies would be sustainable without the existing military ties between Israel and its global partners.

In this report, we have opted to use the term “military ties” to refer to the receipt (via purchase or gift) of any product by a South American military or paramilitary organization that originates either in a branch of the Israeli military itself or from one of the main private Israeli military firms. In addition to vehicles, weapons and ammunition, we will be including equipment such as radar, which in itself is not a weapon but is often sold in packages with weaponry and is developed by the same companies. We will also include the Israeli companies that provide services in South America or train South American security and paramilitary forces. These companies are run by former soldiers and draw on Israeli military training techniques, and although they do not export weapons, they nevertheless are exporting a military product and are linked to the defense establishment. Finally, we will include equipment, such as UAVs and crowd control equipment, although these often fall under the purview of police forces when employed in South America.

The choice to focus primarily on South America, and not Latin America as a whole, is arbitrary and should not distract from the Israeli involvement to the north. Israel was a major player in Central America in the 1970s and 80s, with the Mossad directly involved in a variety of operations. This included supporting the repressive Guatemalan government with arms, advisors and training throughout the 1970s and early 80s; supplying arms to the Somozas in Nicaragua (by the 1970s Israel was responsible for 98% of Nicaraguan arms imports) and later the Contras; supplying Honduras with military equipment; and supplying weapons (83% of defense imports in the second half of the 1970s) and training for the El Salvadoran military. As the United States reasserted its presence in Central America in the late 80s, Israeli influence receded.

In South America, we have chosen to focus on countries that have been developing military ties with Israel over the most recent decade. Nearly all the countries we have selected have a history
of military ties with Israel; Brazil is the only exception. Along the same lines, countries have been omitted if they have a history of involvement with Israel but presently have no ties (Venezuela), or if there simply is little or no evidence of Israeli involvement (Suriname, Uruguay, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, and Bolivia).\textsuperscript{11}

All of our information comes from publicly available sources. These include books, articles published in academic journals, newspaper articles and press releases from various Israeli companies. We have also drawn on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) databases.\textsuperscript{13} These sources have several implications for this report. Arms sales are not always reported, meaning that there are invariably gaps in what we have included. This is even more problematic in terms of the activities of Israeli PMSCs, which are contracted across the continent but only rarely surface in the media (contracts are never advertised). Given the extensive involvement of advisors and mercenaries in Central America and Colombia in the past, as well as the scores of Israeli PMSCs doing business today, it is safe to assume that the current information available on and private security operations only scratches the surface. Oftentimes, PSMC activities only surface in the context of a big media story. In 2009, for example, Israeli security company Mano International Security prevented a pirate attack on an Italian cruise ship off the coast of Somolia. When asked for details, company owner Mano Nik summed up what seems to be a general consensus among PSMCs when he stated, “the company has been working for 22 years covertly, and has no interest in exposure.”\textsuperscript{14}

The same lack of extensive documentation applies to security/military trainings provided by private companies as well as the trainings provided by the official IDF Foreign Training Branch in Israel. Both benefit extensively from the experience of the Israeli army,\textsuperscript{15} and by extension their actions in Palestine and against other Arab populations, but it is impossible to ascertain the profits brought in by these ventures.
III. Military ties: Past and present

“This wasn’t a problem until the 1970s, but when you start large-scale arms manufacturing, exports are essential for the industry’s survival. You have to find a major new customer every 5-10 years. [...] Whether the regime is democratic or not is irrelevant, because it’s a matter of survival.” - Former Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs director general Alon Liel

As early as the 1960s, Israel had military ties with a number of South American countries. Beginning in the 1970s, these military ties were a mainstay of Israeli foreign policy in Latin America as a whole. Israel forged especially strong links with the right-wing military governments that took power during this time, selling weapons and providing training to the militaries and police forces of Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina throughout the 70s. Military ties with Colombia and Argentina began in the late 70s and expanded significantly in the 1980s. Also in the 1980s, Israel sold military equipment to Brazil and Venezuela, but such sales at the time were minimal when compared to other buyers in the region.

Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the combined result of increased demand, the lifting of French arms sanctions on Israel, and the Israeli military’s experience in two wars pushed the Israeli arms makers into global markets. It was at this point that Israeli arms began to flood into Latin America, primarily to rightwing military governments. Israel began supplying arms to the military government in Ecuador in 1974 (several years after the coup), Pinochet’s Chile in 1976 and the Argentine junta in the same year. Military ties with the latter would grow markedly several years later, after the Carter Administration restricted US military assistance to Argentina over the atrocities carried out by the military government.

In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Israeli military influence crumbled along with the military regimes in several South American countries during this period. With the return of a constitutional government in Argentina in 1983 there were no new arms deals signed with Israel. It was also reported at the time that, in an effort to make a break with legacy left by the junta, President Alfosin moved to totally cut off military contact with Israel. In Chile, arms deals slowed considerably with the end of the military government in 1989, but did not cease entirely. The same is true for Ecuador, whose military ties to Israel lost steam completely by the mid-1980s.

While several scattered deals were made with Brazil (1994 and 1996), Uruguay (1997), and Venezuela (1990, 1997, and 1999), there was nothing rivaling the relationships forged during the years of the military dictatorships.

Throughout the past decade, Israeli military companies have been aiming to expand their
operations in South America, with firms like IAI and ITL Optronics attempting to follow lead of already-established companies like Elbit Systems. The prospects are inviting. Currently, and for varying reasons, the large military spenders in Latin America are modernizing their militaries in what a number of commentators have referred to as a new arms race. This creates opportunities for Israeli companies, many of which are already suppliers of conventional arms in the region.

However, Israel is not only interested in pursuing conventional military ties. Advanced technology, primarily in the aerospace sector, is both an untapped market and an Israeli specialty. Having already made serious gains in Europe, Israeli companies are looking to explore similar markets in South America. Elbit Systems, a leading Israeli developer of UAVs and other military technology, was ahead of its time in this regard. It has worked in Brazil for more than 15 years, through its subsidiary Aerielectronica Industria de Componentes Avionicos (AEL) along with a partnership with Embraer, Brazil’s largest aerospace company, allowing it more access to the greater South American market. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) aims to follow suit, and in 2009 it created a joint venture with the Brazilian Synergy Group. According to Defense News,

“We haven’t been active in Brazil, and we decided to go full-blow in pursuit of the civilian and military market there through our partnership with Synergy,’ IAI Chairman Yair Shamir said. ‘The Brazilian market is a strategic objective for IAI, and the decision to establish a [joint venture] together with an essential partner like Synergy shows we mean business.’ Shamir estimated that Latin America now accounts for only about 5 percent of IAI’s overall sales, which reached $3.6 billion in 2008. But IAI expects substantial business growth, with the new joint venture alone possibly delivering more than $100 million in new sales, he said.”

In addition to military hardware, Israel has been involved in training either destabilizing paramilitary forces or armies of right wing governments. This was widespread in Central America, and we have noted that in the 1970s and 80s Israeli mercenaries trained Guatemalan forces, the Contras and the El Salvadoran military. In South America, Israel was also involved in training those who would go on to form the rightwing Colombian paramilitaries that went on to carry out massacres, assassinations and torture in the 1990s.

These days, Israeli mercenaries have been replaced by PMSCs, under the general umbrella of the rapidly expanding Israeli homeland security market. Unlike arms companies, which at least produce tangible products and are subject to some regulation, it is much more difficult to ascertain which and how many PMSCs are operating in South America. However, it does seem that Israeli PMSCs, like their arms producing counterparts, have found South America to be an important market. Large firms that provide training and/or personnel like the Golan Group, Isrex (94) and International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) have websites in Spanish, and both Isrex and
ISDS representatives accompanied Peres on his 2009 trip to Brazil.30

In South America, Israeli trainers and advisors are no longer primarily involved in supporting large-scale paramilitary operations. PMSCs provide bodyguards and similar services for individuals, and are also involved in securing events and gatherings. In 2007, Brazil’s National Secretary of Public Safety Luis Fernando Correa visited Israel to meet with 25 local companies engaged in homeland security. At the time it was estimated that Israel companies would be able to attain at least a third of the Pan-American Olympic event’s security budget, which stood at USD 150 million.31 On the governmental level, the Israeli company Global CST has been involved with training Colombian military forces, while in Peru the same company has been contracted (other reports state that the Peruvian government has yet to decide) to train Peruvian special forces.32
IV. Implications of military ties

Any military ties with Israel, regardless of the country, effectively supports the Israeli occupation and adversely affects the Palestinians and their struggle. Israel is far from completely dependent on outside arms and has a large, developed indigenous military industry that produces much of the equipment used by its military.\(^{33}\) This national military industry survives on exporting, without which it would collapse.\(^{34}\) Thus, international buyers play a critical role in ensuring the survival of the Israeli military industry and the occupation it supports.

The military industry does not only act as a passive supplier, but also profits from the ongoing occupation.\(^{35}\) As a result of constant conflict, the Israeli military (industry) is constantly provided with opportunities to test, develop and improve. A key example is in the field of UAVs, where Israel is able to draw on its extensive “operational experience” to develop its technology, allowing it to become an industry leader despite its comparative lack of resources.\(^{36}\) Another example is the new Israeli Tavor rifle, which was developed in the context of ongoing Israeli operations in Palestinian urban areas and is designed for urban combat.\(^{37}\) Again, the Israeli military experience is a selling point.

Occupation is also profitable for PMSCs and government sponsored trainings of foreign armies. The IDF Foreign Training Branch, for example, is “overbooked” for 2010 with foreign armies looking to “receive Israeli training in urban warfare […] many foreign armies view Israel as an expert in open and guerilla warfare.”\(^{38}\) In the private sector Top-Secure, one of the many companies offering training and advising, employs ex-military and intelligence personnel and advertises, “while on active duty, they acquired extensive knowledge and expertise in operations covering a number of areas which TOP-SECURE now offers its clients.”\(^{39}\)

Greater military ties with Israel will also have negative repercussions in South America, as they discourage accountability for Israeli involvement in past crimes and may be potentially destabilizing. Furthermore, such ties cast doubt on a government’s commitment to human rights, which is especially troubling in countries were social movements, grassroots organizations and communities are attempting to build new political and social systems based on progressive values.
In Palestine: Profiting from the occupation

“The overall picture is that since the 1970s, we’ve had an arms industry that would die if it didn’t export. Consequently, there is intense pressure to find customers, because without them there are no arms for the IDF either. [...] the IDF isn’t a big enough customer for the defence industry. The IDF procures a third of Israel’s defence industry’s output, which means two-thirds must be exported.” - Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs director general Alon Liel

It is a truism that occupation and war are profitable to the defense industry. In our analysis, we would like to focus on two key, interlinked elements of profitability: marketing and development.

The Israeli military industry is able to profit considerably from the occupation in terms of marketing. PSMCs advertise how their employees’ years of experience set them apart, while UAV producers highlight their products’ performance and extensive use by the Israeli military in their press releases. However, advertising need not be as explicit, as in the military industry products are judged on their performance in the field, meaning, “every military operation, not by intent per se, acts as an advertisement for the weapons and techniques used.” IAI VP Corporate Communications Director Doron Suslik effectively corroborated this in an interview with the Israeli magazine Globes, “Some of IAI’s products have combat reputations, which gives them a marketing boost over competing systems [...] weapons must be tested on the battlefield. That’s their real test.” The fact that Israel has a constant “battlefield” in the West Bank and Gaza is a significant advantage to its military industry.

The occupation also provides the military industry opportunities in which to develop more effective products, which in turn increases their appeal in the eyes of international buyers. The same factors that Israeli companies use to advertise their products, such as field experience, operational hours and the like, do in fact yield more effective means of repression. Years of experience in operating in Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps, for example, has helped IWI to develop an effective rifle for urban combat. Constant mobilization by the popular resistance against the Wall has in turn forced the Israeli military to develop more effective means of repression, which has been in turn exported as both products and training.

The fact that the Israeli occupation can translate into profits via the export of weapons, technology and training is one reason why it is has been able to continue. Not only is the occupation profitable, but is also becoming more effective as Israeli companies develop more efficient means of repression and control. The analysis of the companies below, all of which are prominent in South America, is not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, it will touch on some of the main areas where Israel is active in South America in order to illustrate how the current rise in military trade.
Buying into occupation with Israel generates profits and supports the occupation.

**Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs)**: UAVs have become a hot commodity for militaries and police forces worldwide. They range in size from handheld devices, which are used for scouting missions, to larger drones for prolonged surveillance and targeting. Some larger models, such as Elbit’s Hermes and IAI’s Heron, can be outfitted with missiles and sent on attack or assassination missions that can be executed with precision. In 2010, the Israeli Air Force commissioned a new UAV capable of carrying a 1-ton payload. Israeli drones have been purchased by Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia. Chile has expressed interest in following suit.

Elbit and IAI are the two main Israeli companies engaged in the development of UAVs. They are also some of the most active companies in South America, especially in Brazil, and are planning to expand considerably in the coming years. Israel's drones are especially attractive for outside sale because they are “battle tested.” This fact is touted by Israeli firms, and articles posted on IAI’s website, for instance, often reference the performance on the battlefield and the extent to which foreign buyers are satisfied (“priceless-worth its weight in gold” one US General is reported to have said). Unsurprisingly, drones have become a critical export for both IAI and Elbit. In 2007, IAI reported a 56% increase in year-over-year quarterly earnings that was driven, on the military side, by the sale of UAVs. Over the past five years, Elbit has won multi-million dollar UAV contracts with Australia, the UK, Turkey, Canada, Brazil, France, and South Korea for UAVs.

In addition to profit, the ongoing use of UAVs in monitoring, targeting and attacking Palestinian targets has provided opportunities for technological development, which in turn further increase profits. Ran Galli, Corporate Vice President of Major Campaigns for Elbit System, explains that because the Israeli military is constantly “fighting terror”, Israeli companies have an advantage when it comes to “development of new systems, testing them in real-time and adapting and fine tuning following feedback from performance in the field.” Unsurprisingly, when in December 2009 Elbit Systems announced the maiden flight of its newest UAV model, battle experience was one of the selling points:

“The operational experience accumulated by the Hermes systems for the Israeli Defense Forces and other leading armies worldwide, as well as the ongoing improvements based on its operational track record, have maintained this UAV family's leadership in performance, reliability, variety of mission-oriented payloads and more.”

The same events that serve to increase the salability of Elbit and IAI drones have also resulted in hundreds of deaths of Palestinians and Lebanese. In Lebanon drones were used to target ambulances, as well as in several strikes against civilian convoys fleeing the fighting. During the
23-day long assault on Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009, dozens (if not hundreds) of Palestinians were killed in drone attacks, many of them civilians. In one massacre on January 3, 2009, an Israeli drone fired a missile at the al-Maqadma Mosque in Beit Lahia town. Twelve worshippers were killed, and 30 were wounded (3 would later die of their wounds, bringing the total to 15). According to 28-year-old Ata Mansour:

At approximately 17:00 on 3 January 2009, I was hearing sounds of prayers in the mosque. When I was about to go out of my house, a heavy explosion occurred. The pressure of the explosion pushed me back. I saw dust and thick smoke spread over the place. I went out to see what happened. I found beheaded bodies lying on the ground of al-Maqadma Mosque’s entrance. Inside the mosque, a number of worshippers were wounded. I tried to help, so I carried a 15-year-old boy who was bleeding from the head and the right side.

These are the atrocities that the Israeli military markets as successes and that Elbit and IAI count as operational experience. Less than two weeks following the mosque attack, an article on the Israeli military website extolled the role of the UAVs in Gaza:

The success of the IDF thus far in Operation Cast Lead is largely due to the cooperation between different parts of the army—such as various brigades and units. Thanks to the use of UAVs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the IDF has been attaining footage captured from the air, above the Gaza Strip, and collecting data for the ground forces in Gaza.

Small arms: While not as high-profile as drones, Israel (primarily through IWI) is involved with selling and/or producing small arms in South America. IWI is the developer of the Galil and Tavor models of assault rifle. The Galil is the main assault rifle used by the Colombian armed forces, and in a special deal with IWI, the country will produce the rifle nationally. The rifle is also used by the Peruvian armed forces.

IWI is also the creator of the Tavor assault rifle, which is to become the standard chief assault rifle for the Israeli military. Through a deal with IWI, Taurus International Manufacturing is set to produce the Tavor in Brazil. According to the latter, the Brazilian army is in the market for a new
standard issue rifle, and Taurus hopes that the Tavor can take this role.\(^{65}\)

The Tavor has been developed in Israel for urban combat as a wieldier alternative to the M-16. The impetus for the Tavor came from Lebanon. Zalman Sheves, head of Tavor development at IWI, explained that during the first 1982 invasion of Lebanon Israeli forces had to deal extensively with urban warfare and that “the conclusions were that a very compact, light rifle that can be easily used in rooms and when getting off vehicles was needed […] We applied in the gun everything the IDF wanted a future rifle to be after the war.”\(^{66}\) The experience of Israeli forces operating inside Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps was also important in the development of the weapon. In one documentary program,\(^{67}\) an Israeli military officer, also involved in the production of the Tavor, describes how the invasion of urban areas in Gaza and Nablus necessitated the development of this rifle, as it allows the soldier to operate effectively in close quarters.

The same circumstances that have provided the underpinnings of the Tavor’s development also assist in marketing, with the promotional material highlighting that the Tavor “was developed in cooperation with the IDF […] The weapon was ruggedly tested over a period of 3 years, has been qualified and approved by the IDF as the service rifle of the Infantry Forces and has been ordered by the IDF and other countries.”\(^{68}\) In a short promotional video for the same weapon, IWI stresses how the Tavor is “battle tested”, “combat proven” and built by a company with “years of experience.”\(^{69}\) The marketability of the Tavor likely increased following the Gaza war. According to IWI direction Uri Amit, the Israeli military reported that “[…] the weapon is excellent and there is nothing to fix.”\(^{70}\)

**Private military and security companies (PMSCs):** The Golan Group, International Security Academy, Global CST, the International Security and Defense Systems Ltd. (ISDS) are all PSMCs that operate openly in South America. These groups are headed by ex-soldiers who are able to build on the experience and training they received while serving in the Israeli army, ensuring that their military skills turn a profit while at the same time using them to market their products and services.

While ties with Israel may have made sense to dictatorships, alliances with democratic states are out of place. Commenting on the contracting Global CST in Peru, Miguel Jugo of the Association for Human Rights (APRODEH) doubted that a firm headed by an Israeli officer “denounced for massacres of civilian Palestinians” was an appropriate choice for Peru.\(^{71}\) This same argument applies to other South American countries as well. Even if founders and employees of Israeli private security firms were not involved in massacres during their military service, they still gained their experience serving in an army that is regularly condemned for its routine violations of human rights. Hiring these firms effectively makes this experience profitable in the private sector.
Crowd control and policing: A number of companies supply police and crowd control equipment to South American governments. Firms like KoorTrade, Export Erez, and Rabintex all supply equipment to South America, while Beit Alfa Technologies (BAT) is a main supplier of crowd control systems, among them armored vehicles and high-pressure water cannons. In addition to the Israeli military and police forces, Peru, Uruguay and Chile are listed as clients.72

Beit Alfa showcases how companies are involved in an occupation that involves monitoring and controlling a civilian population, with firms operating in this field not only profiting but also developing more efficient means of policing and crowd control. A key example of this is the repression of the weekly demonstrations that are held against the Apartheid Wall and pose a threat to the Israeli military’s control of the West Bank.73

Controlling and breaking demonstrations has been a key concern of the Israeli military, and in this context, more efficient means of repression have been developed. Over the past several years, the Israeli military and police forces have introduced a jeep-mounted cannon capable of firing 60 rounds of tear gas as well as “the skunk”, a mix of chemicals and water which is fired through water cannons and induces nausea and vomiting.74 The weekly demonstrations against the Wall are a perfect opportunity to test and refine these methods, and BAT vehicles, equipped with the latter, are used against demonstrators protesting against the Wall in Bil’in, Ni’lin and other villages.

The constant use of their equipment undoubtedly gives BAT credibility when selling abroad. While the company does not refer to particular experiences in its advertising, it does consider its relationship with the Israeli military and police forces a selling point, stating, “30 years of experience [during which it has] designed, built and supplied a host of unique vehicles and systems for the Israeli Armed Forces, Israeli Ministry of Defense, the Israeli Police and to Police Forces of more than 30 countries around the world.”75
In South America: Contrary to human rights

“In the first place, [military] ties with Israel thrive whenever the military establishments are in direct or indirect control of their governments. Second, Israel’s involvement is quite often directly proportional to a country’s embroilment in a territorial conflict or its difficulties with violent domestic opposition or armed insurgency [...] In so constructing a relationship, Israel has associated itself with notoriously repressive regimes.” - Bishara Bahbah, “Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina”

Military ties with Israel do not only fuel an occupation that affects Palestinians, but also have negative effects on South America. First of all, strengthening ties with Israeli arms producers and PSMC sets a poor precedent in terms of accountability, considering Israel’s support of repressive regimes and role in profiting and fostering from instability in the 60s, 70s and 80s. Secondly, military ties with Israel leaves elements in place which could support or form oppressive, and at the most extreme anti-government activity, in a given country. Finally, even if military ties pose no threat to a country’s stability, support of the Israeli military industry casts doubt on a government’s commitment to human rights.

Israeli military trade in South America has profited from, and at times perpetuated, instability in the region. During the 1981 war between Ecuador and Peru, Israel supplied both sides; the former with weapons and ammunition, and the latter with advanced radar. Weapons sales to Argentina skyrocketed during the Falklands War, especially because of the US refusal to arm the junta. Israel has profited from the current trouble in the border region between Ecuador and Colombia, selling drones to Ecuador in 2008 and supplying the Colombian military with UAVs, arms, ammunition and electronic equipment.

In addition to profiting from conflict, Israel has also aided some of the worst regimes on the continent, among them the juntas of Chile and Argentina where it supplied arms and trained the police forces. It was one of nine countries that recognized Garcia Meza’s coup in Bolivia in 1980. Israeli advisors trained paramilitaries that would form the Colombian death squads, and today it is closely tied with Uribe’s Colombia, which it continues to support despite condemnations from human rights organizations. Furthermore, Israel has been involved in regional right wing coups. It trained the forces of Guatemalan dictator Rois Montt and was possibly involved in the coup in Ecuador, where it later trained the military, although there is not extensive evidence.

Given this troubled history, it is unfathomable that many of these countries are once again building up military ties. Israel has effectively not been punished for the choices it made to provide material support for the human rights abusers, coups and bloodshed of the 1970s and 80s. Instead, the same arms producers are awarded new contracts; Rafael, for example, sold missiles to Pinochet
in the 1980s, and in 2009 company executives were back visiting the country alongside Peres. Examples like this abound across the continent. Welcoming Israeli companies and engaging in business as usual sets a dangerous precedent, and does not encourage companies to think twice about supporting repressive regimes or groups.

The refusal to cut military ties can also be potentially destabilizing for countries in South America. In Colombia, for example, Israeli trainers were involved with the right-wing paramilitaries and drug cartels in the 1980s – these same forces continue to play a negative role in Colombia. Similar incidents are more common in Central America. Leo Gleser, president of the ISDS, accompanied Israeli President Peres on his Latin America trip. In the 1980s, Gleser was involved in training the infamous Battalion 316 in Honduras. Former Battalion 316 members, since integrated into the Honduran police forces, played a role in the 2009 coup against Zelaya and are accused to beating, arresting and torturing anti-coup activists.

In addition to the repercussions of their training programs, PMSCs could themselves also play a destabilizing role. Some PMSC may act as a front for foreign government operations, and other times are employed by states to operate in areas where open and official involvement would be embarrassing. These factors do not bode well when taken in light of Israel’s historical support for right-wing governments (and current antipathy towards those running on progressive platforms).

Finally, whether or not military ties can play a destabilizing role, it is grossly inappropriate for governments elected promising social justice and a respect for human rights. Cases in Central America are the most illustrative; in El Salvador, Israel supported right-wing landowners against left-wing popular organizations by training secret police who engaged in torture and murder. The same was true in Guatemala, when Israel began in 1970s to support the upper classes in their war against the left-wing forces comprised mostly of Indians. This practice was not limited to Central America, and as we have noted above most right-wing governments in South America who carried out human rights abuses against opposition have been supported by Israel. Indeed, since its founding, Israel has operated in South America in a way that is anathema to the struggles of today’s progressive political and social movements.
X. Country reports

What follows are reports on each country with significant military ties to Israel. In terms of general trends, many South American countries have dramatically increased the size of their military budgets and expenditures. With these increases, a number of South American countries have deepened military ties with Israel.

Argentina

Although military ties were strong during the Videla dictatorship, Argentina does not seem to be as keen as other countries in the region in rebuilding its military relationship with Israel. This is a positive development, as deepening military ties with Israeli would run contrary to Argentine values both at home and abroad. In terms of Palestine, President Cristina Kirchner has urged for an end to the conflict based on “the respect of international law and the United Nations Organization’s rules.” Buying from the Israeli military industry, which guarantees the exact opposite, would certainly be counter-productive.

Furthermore, ties with Israel would set a poor precedent in terms of accountability at a time when Argentina is dealing with legacy of the dirty war. Again, it would make little sense to jail those involved in human rights abuses while doing business with the same companies who supplied the material and training.

However, things could change. With a defense budget of an estimated $2.07 billion in 2008, Argentina is a moderate spender in regional terms. Military budgets in the country have been increasing in recent years, and it seems that Israeli military companies are indeed interested in the region.

Israel and the Videla dictatorship

Arms sales to Argentina began when the US, under the Carter administration, restricted military assistance to the country in response to the regime’s ongoing abuses of human rights. This occurred in 1976, and Israel quickly replaced the United States as the regime’s main supplier of weapons. The Beagle Channel dispute (where Israel sold weapons to both Chile and Argentina) and the Falklands War increased arms procurement, with Israel a main supplier. From 1977 – 1984, Israel sold naval vessels, fighter jets, missiles, radar and other military equipment. With the transition back to civilian rule, arms sales dropped dramatically. Following the first year of civilian rule in 1984, arms sales from Israel only included the sale of radar and ex-Israeli helicopters to
Argentina over a 15-year period.\textsuperscript{101}

In addition to supplying arms, Israel provided training and equipment to both the army and security forces. Israel shipped “weapons and other ‘instruments’ for the secret police”\textsuperscript{102} and provided “counterinsurgency instructions” during a time when the government was rounding up and disappearing thousands of primarily leftist activists.\textsuperscript{103} Israeli forces also worked alongside Argentinean forces against popular movements in Central America, together trained security forces in Guatemala and assisted anti-Sandinista forces based in Honduras.\textsuperscript{104}

\textit{Israel and Argentina: Rebuilding ties?}

As far as it is possible to tell, only Elbit Systems has recently gained ground in Argentina, signing a contract with Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina S.A. for the avionics upgrade of 24 AT-63 Pampa aircraft for the Argentine Air Force in 2001. In 2002, the contract was delayed for economic reasons, but resumed in 2004. Deliveries were supposed to be completed in 2007.\textsuperscript{105} Previously in 1995, Elbit subsidiary Elisra won a $40 million contract with Argentina to provide a sensor-systems upgrade for the air force’s Grumman S-2E Trackers, but it is unclear if this contract was ever completed.\textsuperscript{106}

While the Israeli firms Hatehof and Export Erez both list Argentina as a country in which they operate, there are no contracts that have been published in the public domain.\textsuperscript{107} IMI and Tanque Argentino Mediano Sociedad del Estado, along with the countries’ two ministries of defense, are reported to have been developing rocket-launching systems. As of 2003, work on prototypes was completed, but there is no additional information available.\textsuperscript{108}

As such, while military ties with Israel are not flowering as they are in neighboring Brazil, there may still be cause for concern. Like in Brazil, Elbit seems to be gaining a foothold in Argentina; similar Israeli companies are sure to follow. It is no coincidence that during his November 2009 visit to Argentina, Israeli President Shimon Peres was accompanied by representatives from top Israeli defense firms IAI, Koor and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.\textsuperscript{109}
Brazil

Brazil has made it clear that it wishes to play a serious role in the Middle East peace process, perhaps acting as a broker. Meeting with Palestinian, Iranian and Israeli leaders, President Silva da Lula has declared that he aims to bring peace not only to the region, but the world as a whole. Unfortunately, the sincerity of his words are undermined by the actions of his government, which is rapidly building up military ties with Israel and casting doubt on Brazil's ability to act as a fair moderator.

Brazil has the largest defense budget in South America, accounting for 48% of South American arms purchases with a 2009 defense budget of nearly $23.3 billion. Despite being such a large market, there were no extensive military ties between Brazil and Israel prior to 2000. In 1982, for example, all that was reported in terms of conventional transfers was the Brazilian order for 8 Bell-205/UH-1H helicopters. The next recorded order was in 1992, when 8 K-6 120mm mortars were ordered, followed by 1996 order for 400 Python-3 missiles, manufactured by Rafael.

It was after 2000, however, when Israeli companies began to become a critical part of the Brazilian police and military forces, with Elbit Systems taking the lead. This was primarily in high-tech areas, but also extended to conventional arms. Currently, a number of major Israeli arms companies have their sights set on Brazil as the key market in South America.

A decade of military ties
From the year 2000 on, the presence of Israeli companies increased markedly in Brazil. Elbit has been the main player; but other firms in conventional weapons, electronics and security have also seen a growing business.

Elbit Systems Ltd. has been active in Brazil for the past 15 years. According to the company's president, "We identified the potential of this country early on, and we were the first [of the Israeli firms] to become part of their large and very advanced aerospace industry." Elbit made a serious commitment to the Brazilian market in 2001, when it acquired Aeroelectronica Industria de Componentes Avionicos (AEL). The $2.3 million deal gave Elbit control of the majority of the shares, allowing it to use AEL's facilities for the systems upgrade of Brazilian Air Force's Northrop F-5s. AEL, located in Porto Alegre, Brazil, continues to perform engineering, manufacturing and logistical support activities for defense and commercial applications undertaken by Elbit in Brazil.

In 2001, Elbit won a contract to upgrade 46 F-5 aircraft for the Brazilian Air Force, with Embraer
and the Brazilian Government, with a total value of approximately $230 million over an eight-
year period. In January 2007, Elbit Systems was awarded an additional order from the Brazilian
Government to integrate further advanced capabilities in the F-5 aircraft and to establish an in-
country maintenance center based at AEL.118 Other large contracts occurred in 2002 as well as in
2007 and 2008, all with the air force, and a 2009 contract was signed with the army for unmanned
turrets.119

Elbit is not the only Israeli company in the Brazilian market. In 2002, the Brazilian Air Force signed
a $90 million, five-year lease for 12 Kfir aircraft,120 and Rafael-manufactured Derby missiles were
purchased in 2006.121 Most recently, IAI signed a $350 million contract in November 2009 to supply
drones to the Brazilian police - the largest such deal ever between Israel and Brazil.122

In addition to these contracts, Export Erez, Rabintex and I.T.L. Optronics Ltd, all of which are
involved in the military industry, were listed by the Israeli Government’s Export and International
Cooperation Institute as operating in Brazil.

**The future of Israeli military ties to Brazil**

Looking to Elbit as a model, other Israeli companies have been gearing up to further capitalize
on the Brazilian market. UAVs and advanced aviation seem to be the two sectors in which Israeli
companies will be able to make the greatest inroads. Most recently, Peres’ 2009 visit to Brazil gave
an additional boost to military companies Elbit, IAI and Rafael.123

During the 2009 Latin America Aerospace and Defense (LAAD) defense show, 11 main Israeli
military companies participated, along with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Sibat (Foreign Defense
Assistance and Defense Export Organization), and were given a “carte blanche to cultivate
long-term defense trade ties with Brazil, encouraging sales of front-line systems and advanced
technology transfer.”124

Meir Shalit, from Sibat, stated that Brazil is “a key target market and a promising partner. [...] Israeli companies are not looking to sell, but to develop and nurture full partnerships with Brazilian industry, which is very advanced.” He went on to note that while Brazil accounted for less
than 5 percent of the $6.1 billion in new orders signed by Israeli defense firms in 2008, the MoD
hoped to expand it by hundreds of million per year.125

IAI is set to compete with Elbit for the UAV market in Brazil. In addition to its recent UAV deal,
“Israel is willing to jointly develop Brazilian remote sensing satellites based on MoD’s TecSAR radar
satellite and Ofeq high-resolution electro-optical spacecraft.”126 The satellite is developed by Elbit
and IAI.
Most important, however, is the 50/50 joint venture founded by IAI and Synergy Group in Brazil. Given the coming modernization of the Brazilian Armed Forces, the joint venture situates IAI in a favorable position to win upcoming contracts. According to another report, “the joint company will provide an opportunity to expand the Brazilian technological base, will act as a hub for technology and expertise, and will provide maintenance and customer support services for IAI’s various systems in use in Latin America, including the UAV.”

Like IAI, ITL Optronics has ambitions of building up a joint venture and gain a place in the Brazilian and South American market. According to the ITL president, “Up until now, we’ve sold a few millions of dollars in Brazil, but in a few years time, we hope to grow that to a few tens of millions, even more [...] Ultimately, we’d like to get into a joint venture with a local firm and build up our presence.”

A final company is IMI, the creator of the Tavor assault rifle, which was developed in Israel and is to become the standard issue assault rifle for the Israeli military. Through a deal with IMI, Taurus International Manufacturing is set to produce the Tavor in Brazil. The Brazilian army is in the market for a new standard issue rifle, and Taurus hopes that the Tavor can take this role.

Chile

Despite a lack of accountability from the Chilean government, it is clear that Israel is a part of the country’s yearly military expenditures, which totaled at least $4.8 billion in 2008. Dating back to the 1970s, Chile has seen Israel as one of its primary suppliers of arms. While Chile is buying less from Israel than it did during Pinochet’s rule, it does still maintain ties, effectively not punishing Israel for supplying equipment and training that were used to commit human rights abuses.

Supporting the Pinochet regime

Israel had military ties with to the Pinochet regime in 1974, but only became a main supplier in 1976 after the US administration suspended all military aid. This included missiles, radar, light arms, as well aircraft and naval vessels; even cluster bomb technology was included. Israel was especially close to the Chilean Air Force, and Israeli experts assisted in developing an aircraft industry. Arms deals were complemented by official visits by high-ranking military figures.

In addition to providing arms, the Israelis also helped to bolster the internal security forces of the regime, assisting with intelligence and secret police work. BAT, a developer of crowd control vehicles, produced and sold vehicles and water cannons to the Chilean government.
Israel did not only aid the Pinochet regime militarily, but was also supportive on the public relations front. In 1978 for example, then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Mordechai Gur traveled to Chile to promote weapons sales, which at that time included $100 million in missile and radar systems. He claimed that the widespread allegations of torture and murder leveled against the regime were untrue.\textsuperscript{137} Another high ranking official, this time the then-Minister of Communications, visited in 1984 and claimed that the Chilean regime, like Israel and its treatment of “Palestinian terrorists”, was misrepresented in the media.\textsuperscript{138}

In 1990, with the return of democracy to Chile, military ties with Israel lessened, but were still maintained. Throughout the decade, four deals were recorded.\textsuperscript{139} In the mid 90s, Chile purchased ELTA’s PHALCON radar.\textsuperscript{140}

**Ties are rebuilt**

With the turn of the century, arms sales to Chile rose again. From 2000 – 2004, Chile purchased 200 air-to-air missiles and 1000 anti-tank missiles, along with radar systems.\textsuperscript{141} As in the rest of South America, Elbit and IAI both have a presence in Chile.\textsuperscript{142} Rafael is also a key supplier, and Chile has the largest supply of the company’s Spike missiles on the continent.\textsuperscript{143} IMI has also been active; its 82 mm rocket launchers are reportedly employed by the Chilean military.\textsuperscript{144}

In addition, it seems that Soltam, Rabinex and Export Erez all have, or are trying to procure, contracts in the country. However, the extent of their involvement is unclear.

Chile seems to be in the market for some of the more advanced technology Israel sells, and the key players have been competing for contracts. According to Jane’s Defense, Chile currently requires a new UAV, “designed for combat intelligence and long-range artillery target designation, to be operational between 2010 and 2012” and several companies, among them IAI, are being considered.\textsuperscript{145}

IAI is not the only company looking for a piece of the market. In 2006, Rafael decided to unveil its then-new mini-UAV, the SkyLite B, at the FIDAE Defense Exhibition in Santiago.\textsuperscript{146} Rafael intends to market the UAV along with its Spike missiles and Tycoon tactical C4I system as a package deal that can be employed for both information gathering and attack operations.\textsuperscript{147}

BAT continues to operate in the country. No new deals have been reported since 1994, when the kibbutz sold another vehicle, which included a computerized water cannon for breaking up demonstrations, to the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{148} However, this does indicate that the country has maintained ties with BAT even after the return of a democratically elected government.
Colombia

Throughout the twentieth century, Colombia’s spending on defense and security has increased steadily. Colombia has the second largest military budget in the region, with spending reaching at least $6.56 billion in 2008. The government argues that its increased military spending is the result of its war with the FARC and its fight against drug trafficking.

Supplying the state and the paramilitaries

Israeli military ties with Colombia began in the 1980s. In the early years of the decade, Israel advisors trained Colombians dissatisfied with their government’s fights against FARC and ELN guerillas. One of these, the infamous Carlos Castaño, went on to head the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the umbrella organization for rightist paramilitary groups in Colombia. Salvatore Mancuso, another leader of the AUC, was also trained by the Israelis. In the 1990s, he was responsible for organizing the paramilitaries of Convivir (financed by the current president and then governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe).

In the press, several Israelis have been identified as training those that would form the death squads in Colombia. In 2007, it was reported that Yair Klein, Melnik Ferri and Tzedaka Abraham were being charged with setting up training camps providing instruction about explosives and assassinations for paramilitaries tied to the drug cartels.

Klein, who stated that he had been hired with the full knowledge of the Colombian Ministry of Defense to organize security in the northern region of Uraba, was head of the security firm Spearhead. Through this firm, he set up paramilitaries in Puerto Boyacá after the ceasefire of May 1984. In 1991, following the release of a tape in which Klein made the mistake of filming the training sessions, he was convicted and fined $13,400 by an Israeli court for selling arms to Colombia’s illegal groups. However, his conviction should not create the impression that Israeli ties in Colombia were established against the will of the Israeli state. Security firms set up by ex-military personnel are quite common in Israel, and must have prior clearance from the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) to operate abroad. Moreover, the MoD often transfers un-desirable clients to private security firms, eliminating possibly embarrassing ties.

Klein was not only tied to training paramilitaries in Colombia, however. In 1987, Israeli trainers associated with Klein were also training Nicaraguan Contras in Honduras and Cost Rica. These Israelis most likely operated not only with Israeli government, but also US government permission. According to journalist Andrew Cockburn, who interviewed Klein in 1989 at a Spearhead training center in Israel, another ex-army officer and associate of Klein’s named Amatzia
Shuali spoke openly of training the officers in the Guatemalan Army.\textsuperscript{160} He was involved directly with training the Nicaraguan Contras in Honduras.\textsuperscript{161}

Israeli sources also supplied the paramilitaries with arms. Klein was implicated in a scandal wherein "a large shipment of Israeli arms that wound up with Colombian traffickers in 1989 was arranged and financed with the help of three former Israeli military officials who laundered payments for the weapons through a Panamanian bank."\textsuperscript{162} In a separate incident in 2001, Israeli company GIRSA managed to ship assault rifles and ammunition to the AUC.\textsuperscript{163}

In addition to Colombian paramilitaries, the Israeli military industry has also been a supplier of the Colombian military, in particular its air force. The largest deal took place in 1988 – 89, when Colombia received Kifr C-2 combat aircraft as well as Shafrir-2 missiles for the Kifrs.\textsuperscript{164} Through a deal with IWI, Colombia’s Indumil manufactures the Galil assault rifle, which is used by the police and military.

\textbf{Ties remain strong}

Little has changed in Israel-Colombia military ties over the years. While the 1990s were quiet as far as reported conventional weapons transfers are concerned, the present decade has seen a jump in sales. Colombia continues to use Israeli light arms and ammunition,\textsuperscript{165} and in addition to the Galil, the Colombian military has been photographed with the IWI Negev machine gun as well as the newer IMI Tavor assault rifle. According to Vice Minister of Defense, Juan Carlos Pinzón, Colombia has been in talks with IWI “to see the possibility to make ourselves a factory, or at least in part, for the next generation of Galil assault rifles.”\textsuperscript{166}

The sector that has benefited most seems to be the Colombian Air Force. In 2007, IAI delivered the first of 12 modernized Kifr fighters to Colombia.\textsuperscript{167} Along with the planes, Israel has also supplied Phython and Shafrir missiles from Rafael as well as Griffin bombs from IAI.\textsuperscript{168} Elbit Systems, through the Brazilian firm Embraer, won a $17 million contract to supply avionic systems.\textsuperscript{169} There are also reports that Israel has supplied Colombia with UAVs, but the make and model have not been revealed.\textsuperscript{170}

Unsurprisingly, Israel has been identified as Colombia’s top weapons supplier.\textsuperscript{171} Already in 2007, Colombia’s Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santo visited Israel with the stated intention of “strengthen[ing] cooperation, not only in the defense field but in every area.”\textsuperscript{172} In 2009, it was announced that the Colombian armed forces would be upgraded to the tune of $4 billion, and that Israeli firms would profit considerably.\textsuperscript{173}

In addition to buying arms and military equipment, Colombia continues to solicit Israeli advisors.
Not put off by Israeli involvement with paramilitary forces, the Colombian military has brought in Israeli ex-military personnel, now private contractors, to advise the Colombian armed forces. “Israel’s methods of fighting terror have been duplicated in Colombia,” a Colombian senior defense official was quoted as saying.\textsuperscript{174}

In 2007, it was widely reported that the Colombian government hired three high-ranking Israelis, all ex-military, for $10 million. One of the men brought on board by the Colombian government has been identified as Israel Ziv, owner of the security company Global CST.\textsuperscript{177} Aside from the fact they provided counter-terrorism trainings, information on the exact activities of the Israeli advisors is scarce, although at least one source states, “the Israelis provide specialized interrogation techniques to improve the flow of intelligence from the de-briefings.”\textsuperscript{175} In addition, FARC has claimed that Israeli commandos are operating in combat against guerillas and forces loyal to the drug lords.\textsuperscript{176}

**Ecuador**

Throughout the latter part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the defense minister, chief of staff, officers - and even Ecuadorian youth - were regulars in Israel, where they were given training from Israeli military personnel.\textsuperscript{178} Over the years, much of Ecuador’s defense budget has been directed towards millions of dollars worth of deals and contracts with Israel.\textsuperscript{179} Since 1988, Ecuador has seen its yearly military expenditures more than quadruple, reaching $1.36 billion in 2008.\textsuperscript{180}

Today, Ecuador has been increasingly critical of Israel. Following the war on Gaza in 2009, Ecuadorian lawmakers called on the world to “pursue those responsible for these crimes against humanity.”\textsuperscript{181} However, Ecuador is at the same time reported to have purchased Israeli drones, and it is unclear how a country can purchase the means of the repression it has condemned.

**Supporting the dictatorship**

From the 1960s to the 1980s Israel enjoyed, with a disruption in the beginning of the 1980s, strong military ties with Ecuador. These ties were the strongest during the dictatorship, which lasted until 1979. Relations cooled somewhat with the election of Jamie Roldos Aguilera, but the shift immediately following his death in 1981 (leading to the election of Leon Febres Cordero in 1984) and the war with Peru were both driving factors in the re-establishment of warm military relations.\textsuperscript{182} While ties continued through the 1990s, they were not as extensive as those in the 1970s and 80s.

The militaries of Ecuador and Israel have ties stretching back as far as the early 1960s, when
Ecuador was one of the first Latin American countries to adopt Israeli military/agricultural programs. During the 1960s, Ecuador was one of the Latin American countries sending youth to Israel for training; this included many military academy students.

Several years after the 1972 coup in Ecuador, Israel began to ship a considerable amount of weapons to the country. Between 1973 and 1976, $200 million in small arms and ammunition as well as explosives were delivered. During the same period, in 1974 and 75, Israel sold both mortars and light transport aircraft. Later in the decade, Israel sold the Ecuadorian armed forces advanced missiles. In 1977, after the United States barred Israel from exporting the Kfir, it compromised and sold Nesher jets, which had no export restrictions. Throughout the decade, Israel was also giving technical assistance, building weapons factories, and supplying technology and expertise for several Ecuadorian military industries. Israel advisors also trained the Ecuadorian armed forces.

Relations cooled with the replacement of the military government, but picked up again with the 1980 conflict with Peru, during which Israel offered to let Ecuador rent both Israeli fighter pilots and jets for $500,000 a day and commandos for $100,00 a day. Several years later, in 1982, Israel was finally allowed by the United States to sell Kfir aircraft, accompanied by Shafrir missiles. This marked the last of the major recorded arms deals in the decade (mortars were ordered in 1986). In 1996, four additional Kfir’s were delivered.

At a crossroads
As in other South American countries, UAV technology is highly sought after for use on borders. In Ecuador, it is likely that Elbit systems won a contract to supply the country with Hermes 450 drones, to be used for border patrol. Other reports state that Ecuador purchased several drones for use in the navy. Also, according to an announcement from Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, the air force is set to upgrade its fleet to IAI Kfir jets.
XI. Recommendations

It is critical that military ties between Israel and South America are challenged. The export of military products is essential for the survival of the Israeli military industry, and South America is rapidly becoming a key buyer. Confronting this will not only ensure that Israeli firms do not become further entrenched in the region’s economic development, but can also have immediate effects on the industry itself, and by extension the ability of the Israeli military and government to maintain and develop the occupation. In 1977, when the Carter administration blocked a major IAI deal, it was reported that the company would be hit with layoffs.\textsuperscript{195} Tadiran and Soltam, both key Israeli makers of military hardware, also lost considerably and had to scale back operations as a direct result of the Iranian revolution.\textsuperscript{196}

The loss of even one contract can be incredibly important. Often weapons systems are sold in packages (jet-missile and UAV-missile-targeting systems are two common examples), and the loss of one could affect the remainder. Further, a company with a contract for hardware will often be contracted years later for maintenance or upgrades; meaning that any losses now will affect future profits. \textbf{Military ties may be challenged in the following ways:}

\textbf{Challenge contracts}
While military contracts are not the most transparent of dealings, some are reported. As such, those done in the open can be challenged, especially in countries were parties committed to progressive values hold sway, on various grounds:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Israeli military arms and technology are built on the repression of the Palestinians. Governments and parties must be challenged on the grounds that ties with Israel run completely contrary governments with a stated commitment to human rights.
  \item Israeli arms dealers often engage in bribery, and therefore it may be possible to derail contracts on legal grounds. India for example blacklisted IMI over allegations of bribery.\textsuperscript{197} In December 2009 the OECD released a country report expressing serious concern about Israel’s insufficient interest and legal framework as far as bribery of foreign officials by the Israeli arms industry are concerned. It is reported that “commissions” represent 10 to 15 percent of total foreign sale.\textsuperscript{198}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Expose agents}
Many, if not all, of the Israeli arms dealers working in South America are members or ex-members of the Israeli military. Furthermore, some have been in the region for years and may have been
connected with training of death squads and/or supplying arms to the dictatorships and/or paramilitaries in the 70s and 80s. In some countries, depending on the legal system, it could be possible to bring these individuals to court.

**Divestment**
In addition to challenging contracts, it is also possible to fight military ties on a local level through divestment. Given the widening operations of these Israeli companies, as well as the growing number of local subsidiaries and joint ventures, it is very likely that funds with some accountability to the public are invested in Israeli firms. To date, several pension funds have divested from Elbit Systems for its role in building the Wall, and there is no reason why South American funds should continue to hold investments in Elbit or similar firms. Investments in the public sphere that may have ethical guidelines and are accountable to the public are excellent targets.

**Protest trade shows**
Exhibitions like FIDAE in Chile and LAAD in Brazil are attended by all major Israeli defense firms, and provide a space for connections to be made to the South American market.

**Link up with the Palestinian boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) National Committee (BNC) and the global BDS movement**
As part of its efforts to strengthen the global BDS movement, the BNC promotes efforts against arms trade and military ties with Israel.

- For the Palestinian BDS call see: http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/52
- For more on arms trade see: http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/3
- To get in touch with the BNC’s arms trade working group, contact: global@stopthewall.org
About Stop the Wall and the BNC

The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall) is the main national grassroots body coordinating the struggle against the Wall. We are a coalition of 10 popular district committees active in over 100 communities, youth committees and 13 Palestinian NGOs. Stop the Wall acts as the voice of communities on the local level and as their mobilization and coordination tool on the national and international level.

Our goals are:

- the immediate cessation of the Wall’s construction;
- the dismantlement of all parts of the Wall;
- the full restitution of land and property and compensation for damages and losses.

These calls are firmly grounded in the context of the struggle against Israeli colonization, apartheid and occupation, and for Palestinian rights and self-determination.

In order to achieve these goals and to support the communities in their struggle to safeguard their lands, existence, and future, the Campaign:

- Supports and coordinates local and national efforts of the communities resisting the Wall.
- Supports people’s steadfastness in their lands despite the devastating effects of the Wall.
- Raises awareness on the international level about the implications of the Wall, and mobilizes solidarity for the communities affected by the Wall, through coordination with international organizations and movements.
- Calls for international boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel. This is seen as the most effective way to force Israel to comply with international law and human rights.
- Links the Palestinian struggle against the Wall and Occupation to the world-wide struggles against war, globalization, and colonization.
- Activate international organizations, movements and actors to support the Campaign.

The Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions Campaign National Committee (BNC) is the coordinating body for the BDS campaign based on the Palestinian civil society BDS Call of 2005. Upholding civil and popular resistance to Israel’s occupation, colonization and apartheid, the BNC is a broad coalition of leading Palestinian political parties, unions, coalitions and networks representing the three integral parts of the people of Palestine: Palestinian refugees; Palestinians in the occupied
West Bank (including Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip; and Palestinian citizens of Israel.

The BNC, which is the guiding reference for the global BDS movement, adopts a rights-based approach and calls for the international BDS campaign to be sustained until the entire Palestinian people can exercise its inalienable right to freedom and self determination and Israel fully complies with its obligations under international law to:

- End its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantle the Wall;
- End its legalized and institutionalized system of racial discrimination, or apartheid, against the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel; and
- Respect, protect and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes of origin and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.

BNC member organizations are:
Council of National and Islamic Forces in Palestine, General Union of Palestinian Workers, Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions, Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), Palestinian National Institute for NGO’s, Federation of Independent Trade Unions, Global Palestine Right of Return Coalition, Occupied Palestine and Syrian Golan Heights Initiative, General Union of Palestinian Women, Union of Palestinian Farmers, Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (STW), National Committee for Popular Resistance, Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), National Committee to Commemorate the Nakba, Civic Coalition for the Defense of Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem (CCDPRJ), Coalition for Jerusalem, Union of Palestinian Charitable Organizations, Palestinian Economic Monitor, Union of Youth Activity Centers-Palestine Refugee Camps.
Endnotes

1  http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml
2  See discussion in “Methodology” for a definition of the goods and services that constitute military ties.
3  UAVs are also referred to as drones.
4  Progressive values include a greater commitment to social justice as well as a respect for human rights, both nationally and internationally.
8  Jamail, Milton and Gutierrez, Margo, “Israel in Central America: Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rice”, p. 29
9  Ibid. p. 30
10 This is not to say that Central American countries are not still affected. Take for example the issue of Honduras, where the Israeli trained Battalion 316 functioned as a death squad in the 1980s before some of its members were integrated into the police and security forces. These same individuals supported the 2009 coup and committed human rights abuses against anti-coup activists. See: http://www.ww4report.com/node/7622
11 According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, from 1950 – 2008 the only recorded transfer of military equipment between Israel and any of these countries was that of 15 ex-Israeli tanks to Uruguay.
12 The “Israeli military industry” thus refers to the production of military goods (vehicles, weapons, ammunition, radar, and other equipment) and services (training, private security and mercenaries)
13 The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is an online database containing information on all international transfers of seven categories of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. We have also used SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database, which provides military expenditure data by country. See www.sipri.org for more information.
14 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1082160.html
15 http://www.israeltoday.co.il/default.aspx?tabid=178&nid=20467
16 Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs director general Alon Liel quoted in Globes. http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms_up_the_nations.htm
17 According to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Brazil purchased an ex-Israeli helicopter in 1982 while Venezuela purchased 8 light transport planes for the national guard throughout the 80s. The only weapon system purchased was by Venezuela, when it bought the LAR – 160 (an artillery system) in 1982.
18 There was a French embargo from 1967 – 1972, which was critical in pushing Israel to develop an indigenous arms industry. See: Lockwood, Larry, “Israel’s Expanding Arms Industry”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer, 1972), p. 83
19 http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms_up_the_nations.htm
21 Ibid. p. 96
22 According to SIPRI: From the 1976 – 1980, there were 4 major arms transfers, from 1980 – 1989 there were 12, and from 1990 – 2000 there were 5.
23 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
24 Ibid.
Stop the Wall Campaign

27 http://www.narconews.com/Issue29/article729.html
29 Israel is also a world leader in the homeland security market. As of 2008, there were 600 companies in the homeland security sector, 350 of which exported their goods and services. Turnover for this sector was approximately $4 billion, with $1 billion in exports. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with this sector and the hundreds of companies operating in it, suffice to say that it is closely tied with the Israeli military and intelligence services. For economic information, see: http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/7C2F6937-A259-4AA-9C29-DE351032B87A.htm, for links to military see: Gordon, Neve, The Political Economy of Israel’s Homeland Security, 2009.
30 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/President_Peres_state_visit_Brazil_Argentina_9-Nov-2009.htm. It is telling that of the 17 companies (of 40) listed on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released, nearly half are involved in either the defense and/or homeland security markets.
31 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3250994,00.html. One of these companies was ISDS
33 This is not to downplay the role of countries like the United States, which provide massive amounts of funding and weapons that in turn are used by the Israeli military.
34 http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms unto the nations.htm
35 This phenomenon extends far beyond the military sector. There are dozens of software companies, for instance, that owe their successes to their founders’ experience in the military. See: Bamford, James, The Shadow Factory, New York, 2008. The same applies for other sectors as well.
36 http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml
37 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N7X0phq4w
38 http://www.israeltoday.co.il/default.aspx?tabid=178&nid=20467. These trips are also important for building relationships with foreign militaries outside of the realm of trainings. See: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/135724
39 http://www.top-secure.com/?pld=8
40 Former Ministry of Foreign Affairs director general Alon Liel quoted in Globes. http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms unto the nations.htm
42 http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms unto the nations.htm
43 We can see that many of these products are determined by the nature of the Israeli occupation. The occupied Palestinian population has always been, in the conventional sense, militarily weak, and those in charge of maintaining the occupation have been increasingly concerned not with competing against an equally matched opponent on the battlefield, but rather in developing methods of policing, observing and controlling the Palestinian population. These factors have led to the growth of a military industry that produces technology and equipment to assist in surveillance and control alongside conventional arms, often marketed abroad as homeland security equipment.
44 UAVs are also referred to as drones.
45 In a report issued after the 2009 bombardment on Gaza, Human Rights Watch condemned the Israeli military for its use of UAVs. Despite the advanced targeting systems and ability of "drone operators to view objects on the ground in detail during both day and night, UAV attacks killed as many 87 civilians. See: Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles, New York, June 2009.
46 http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Israel_Commissions_One_Ton_UAV_Bomber_999.html
48 “Israeli technology is “battle-tested,” giving it an operational history by which the reliability and effectiveness of the machines can be judged. Every military operation, not by intent per se, acts as an advertisement for the weapons and techniques used.” http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml. This is corroborated by the Israeli military industry. In an interview with Globes, IAI VP Corporate Communications Directorate Doron Suslik stated, “Some of IAI’s products have combat reputations, which gives them a marketing boost over competing systems. The defence
industry makes weapons, and weapons must be tested on the battlefield. That’s their real test.” http://www.arcuk.org/pages/arms_unto_the_nations.htm


50 http://www.spacewar.com/reports/UAV_Sales_Help_IAI_Bottom_Line_999.html

51 See regular press releases published at http://www.elbitsystems.com/

52 “Mini drones, rifle-propelled cameras and armoured robots to defend the West Bank separation barrier: the International Conference on Low Intensity Conflict was a striking illustration of just how much the intifada has precipitated the modernisation of the Israeli army.” http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040326103348.xf6v6z0o.html

53 Quoted in Gordon, Neve, The Political Economy of Israel’s Homeland Security, p. 42


55 UAVs have been a central reason for increasing IAI profits. See: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/UAV_Sales_Help_IAI_Bottom_Line_999.html Elbit continues to make massive deals in South America as well as Europe for its UAVs.


57 See: Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights, Cast Lead Offensive in Numbers n/d, as well Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles, New York, June 2009

58 Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Targeted Civilians, September 2009, p. 52

59 Ibid.

60 “UAVs Are One Step Ahead in Gaza,” Quoted in: http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10312.shtml

61 IWI was formerly a division of Israeli Weapon Industries (IMI).

62 http://www.yourindustrynews.com/colombia%E2%80%99s+military+upgrade+gains+momentum_30749.html


66 http://www.israel-weapon.com/default.asp?catid={3E31AB82-2BB0-11D7-92D3-0080AD76B634}

67 While the program in question was aired on the “Discovery Channel”, which air programs on science and history, it functioned more as a long advertisement for the Tavor rifle. See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0N7X0pvhQ4w

68 See promotional material available at IWI’s website: http://www.israel-weapon.com/default.asp?catid={3E31AB82-2BB0-11D7-92D3-0080AD76B634}

69 Video available at IWI website: http://www.israel-weapon.com/


72 http://www.efronim.org.il/db/showcomp.pl?comp=Beit+Alfa+Technologies. In the past, BAT has been criticized for selling to Pinochet’s Chile (http://www.ha-keshet.org.il/english/Seeds.htm) as well as “selling anti-riot vehicles for use against protesters in the black townships” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/07/southafrica.israel


74 http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/Tech/09/08/0901.htm

75 http://www.bat.co.il/index.php

76 Bahbah, “Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina”, pp. 97 - 98

77 Ibid. p. 81

78 Ibid. p. 88

79 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1214132691688&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull


81 Israel was even more involved with the right wing governments of Central America that follow the same
pattern. The dictatorship of Nicaragua, for example, had Israeli support since the 1950s. This expanded greatly when the US cut off military aid; see Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israel Connection*, London, 1988

82 Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israel Connection*, p. 104  
84 Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israel Connection*, p. 79  
86 See the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database for the 1980s.  
87 http://mexidata.info/id1524.html and http://www.democracynow.org/2000/6/1/who_is_israels_yair_klein_ and  
89 “In their book, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the US-Israeli Covert Relationship (HaperCollins, 1991, p. 224-5), Andrew and Leslie Cockburn also write that IDF Col. Leo Gleser’s private firm, International Security and Defense Systems (ISDS), provided training in 1984 for a secret Honduran army unit, the 316 Battalion, in a deal arranged by the CIA. The 316 Battalion was later implicated in a string of “disappearances,” torture and political assassinations.” http://www4report.com/static/42.html  
91 For transferring potentially embarrassing operations to private contractors see: Haapiseva-Hunter, Jane, Israeli foreign policy: South Africa and Central America, 1996, p. 155. For the possibilities of PMSCs as government fronts, see: Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, "Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies", Geneva, March 2005. The authors note that while some PMSCs have been government fronts, it is not the norm.  
92 Bolivia and Venezuela are two examples of the latter. Both pulled their ambassadors from Tel Aviv over the Gaza war.  
93 http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Israel/Israel_LAmer_TrailTerror.html  
94 ibid.  
96 “On August 29, 2008, a court in Buenos Aires sentenced two former Argentinean military officers to life imprisonment for the April 1976 kidnapping, torture and disappearance of senator Guillermo Vargas Aignasse. [...] More than 9,000 people are officially listed as having disappeared during the military’s systematic crackdown on leftist opponents. However, human rights groups have estimated the number of victims to be 30,000.” http://www.amnesty.ca/take_action/good_news/argentina_generals_jailed.php  
97 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database  
99 Bahbah, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina," pp. 88 - 93  
100 Bahbah, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina,” pp. 90 – 91, SIPRI database  
101 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database  
102 Bahbah, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina,” p. 91  
103 http://rete-eco.it/it/approfondimenti/europa-usa-etc/10101-official-judaism-dictatorship-and-qpirkei-avotq-.html  
104 Bahbah, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina,” p. 95  
105 http://www.secinfo.com/drPan.uh2.htm  
107 For Hatehof see: http://www.export.gov/gov/Eng_Articles/Article.asp?ArticleID=9200&CategoryID=976&page =1; for Export Erez see: http://www.secinfo.com/d12atd.5f8By.htm  
109 http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3801128,00.html  
111 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=aX_BYuoiCxU
Buying into occupation

SIPRI Yearbook 2009

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Ibid.


http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.s1kB3.htm

http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1?SessionID=P15OW0RaIQA0p9d&ID=5246268


SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1127471.html

http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=16300


Ibid.

Ibid.

http://www.stratpost.com/israeli-heron-uav-makes-mark-on-brazil


SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israel Connection*, p. 99

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

http://www.ha-keshet.org.il/english/Seeds.htm Beit Alfa has sold to repressive regimes in the past. In addition to selling to Pinochet, it also developed crowd control systems for the apartheid regime in South Africa for use against black townships. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/07/southafrica.israel

http://www.ivc-online.com/ivcWeeklyItem.asp?articleID=217

Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israel Connection*, p. 100

SIPRI Arms Database


Ibid.

For Elbit, see: http://www.aviationweek.com/shownews/02fidae/special.htm

http://www.taringa.net/posts/noticias/3170527/el-misil-antitanque-spike-del-ejercito-de-chile.html

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+law+gets+tougher:+the+shoulder-launched+light+anti-armour+weapon...-a0146354598


http://www.rafael.co.il/marketin/news.aspx?FolderID=466&docID=1376

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BashViewPost&newspaperUserld=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostld=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a8a98291f-1f83-466e-ab81-969d5299e9aa&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest


http://cubapolidata.com/?tag=military-spending

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/columbia.htm

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17124 It is widely reported that Castaño wrote about his training in Israel, and the extent to which it influenced him, in his book *My Confession*.

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17124
Given the secretive nature of paramilitary training and difficulty of obtaining names of companies and individuals, as well as the history of Israeli forces training paramilitaries in Central America, it is safe to assume that Israeli involvement in with the Colombian paramilitaries is more extensive than the several individuals who have been named.

Ibid.

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17124

http://www.democracynow.org/2000/6/1/who_is_israels_yair_klein_and


http://www.narconews.com/Issue29/article729.html

Ibid.

http://www.democracynow.org/2000/6/1/who_is_israels_yair_klein_and

Ibid.


http://jeremybigwood.net/Dirtywork/apstoryNica.htm

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http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3435949,00.html

http://www.mexidata.info/id1524.html

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3435949,00.html

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/998838.html

Bahbah, Bishara, "Israel's Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina", pp 77-78

Ibid. p 78.

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database


Even with elected governments, the military maintains considerable power in governmental affairs. See: p. 81

Bishara, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina", p. 77 These programs “utilized the armed forces for agricultural tasks [and were important in] building a positive and constructive image of the armed forces [...] since the military had just seized power after ousting the constitutional government.”

Ibid. p 78

Ibid. p 78

SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

Ibid.

Bishara, "Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina", p. 80

Ibid. pp. 82 - 84

Ibid. 82

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http://www.menewsline.com/article-1586-Israel-Sells-UAVs-To-Ecuador.aspx


Bahbah, “Israel’s Military Relationship with Ecuador and Argentina”, p. 80

Bahbah, Bishara, “Israel’s Private Arms Network” MERIP Middle East Report, No. 144, The Middle East: Living by the Sword (Jan. - Feb., 1987), pp. 9-11


http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11084.shtml

http://ecodiario.eleconomista.es/internacional/noticias/455984/04/08/Amplia-participacion-de-la-industria-militar-israeli-en-Feria-de-Santiago.html